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I. INTRODUCTION 
In my article, The Anti-Blackstonians,1 I expanded my role as a 
responder to Dr. Laudan’s paper2 by adding criticisms of other authors whose 
ideas, in my view, would not advance the goal of reducing wrongful 
convictions nor improve the criminal justice system.3  My truncated critique 
 
* Professor, Criminal Justice Department, Wayne State University. 
 1  Marvin Zalman, The Anti-Blackstonians (Sept. 9, 2017) (draft manuscript) (on file 
with author).  To read the updated, published version of this article, see Marvin Zalman, The 
Anti-Blackstonians, 48 SETON HALL L. REV. 1319 (2018). 
 2  Larry Laudan, Different Strokes for Different Folks: Fixing the Error Patterns in 
Criminal Prosecutions by ‘Empiricizing’ the Rules of Criminal Law and Taking False 
Acquittals Seriously, 48 SETON HALL L. REV. 1243 (2018). 
 3  This included Daniel Epps, The Consequences of Error in Criminal Justice, 128 HARV. 
L. REV. 1065 (2015). 
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of an article and chapter by Professor Paul Cassell invited a response;4 he 
rose to the challenge and joined the Symposium in his essay which responds 
primarily to Dr. Larry Laudan’s essay and my comments.5  My brief reply 
here will not fully canvass all the issues raised in his response; it is intended 
to clarify for readers a few issues raised by Professor Cassell, while perhaps 
leaving some stones to be turned over at a later time and place.  In this brief 
reply, I will: in Part II, address Professor Cassell’s views on my supposedly 
half-hearted innocentrism and the question of ideological predilections in 
legal scholarship; in Part III, make a few comments about Professor Cassell’s 
reply to my critique of his article and chapter; in Part IV, make a few 
comments about Professor Cassell’s expansion on Professor Laudan’s ideas; 
and in Part V, conclude. 
II. BLACKSTONIANS AND INNOCENTRICS 
Although I disagree with Professor Cassell on most points (and 
tentatively agree on others in principle) his comments helped me clarify 
intended meanings that were vague or implied in my Anti-Blackstonians 
article.  I begin with his characterization of my review as an ad hominem 
attack,6 which according to Professor Cassell, characterizes him as 
ideologically driven, while as he put it, I, presumably, am not.7  I simply 
meant to contrast our apparent ideological preferences as conservative (his) 
and liberal (mine).  Buried in my article is my view that every person 
necessarily “carries” an ideology or political preference,8 and in the 
conclusion I attempted to explain that my “nonepistemic” support for the 
Blackstone principle rests on “my values [which] lead me to fear abuses of 
state power more than criminal harms.”  I can see where this statement of 
my ideological position may have been too subtle to be detected and got lost 
in the shuffle, especially as I did not use the dreaded “L” word.  I will use 
 
 4  See Paul G. Cassell, Freeing the Guilty Without Protecting the Innocent: Some 
Skeptical Observations on Proposed New “Innocence” Procedures, 56 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 
1063 (2012) [hereinafter Cassell, Freeing the Guilty]; Paul G. Cassell, Can We Protect the 
Innocent Without Freeing the Guilty? Thoughts on Innocence Reforms That Avoid Harmful 
Tradeoffs, in WRONGFUL CONVICTIONS AND THE DNA REVOLUTION: TWENTY-FIVE YEARS OF 
FREEING THE INNOCENT 264–90 (Daniel S. Medwed ed., 2017) [hereinafter Cassell, Can We 
Protect the Innocent]. 
 5  Paul G. Cassell, Tradeoffs Between Wrongful Convictions and Wrongful Acquittals: 
Analyzing the Risks and Avoiding the Risks, 48 SETON HALL L. REV. 1435 (2018) [hereinafter 
Cassell, Tradeoffs].  
 6  Id. at 1467 n.141, 31. 
 7  Id. at 1472; I quoted from a news account of his efforts to bring a Miranda challenge 
before the Supreme Court.  See Zalman, supra note 1, at 1393 n.385 (quoting Roger Parloff, 
Miranda on the Hot Seat, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 26, 1999), http://www.nytimes.com/1999/09/26/
magazine/miranda-on-the-hot-seat.html). 
 8  Zalman, supra note 1, at 1366 n.253. 
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this reply in part as a prequel to my article. 
To be human is to have cognitive biases and predilections.9  Among 
those, we all carry political preferences, which social scientists label 
“ideologies.”  Ideology is a loaded word which connotes many things, often 
negative, but cannot be avoided.  Political scientist Judith Shklar ran into a 
buzz saw of criticism when she offered the view that lawyers have a 
professional ideology, “legalism”—”the ethical attitude that holds moral 
conduct to be a matter of rule following.”10  Ideologies can include the 
familiar left-right spectrum of viewing other people as more or less like “us” 
so that “we” are more or less willing to share our goods with them.  Another 
ideological spectrum is comfort with state power, from  statist (whether on 
the left or right) to the anti-statist ideologies of anarchy on the left or 
libertarianism on the right.11  Other ideological vectors exist so that applying 
a simple label to a writer (e.g., “liberal”; “conservative”) misses a lot of 
nuance.  Having an ideological predisposition does not necessarily drive a 
person to blindly follow an “ideologically correct” position.  Some 
ideologies are extreme; others are moderate.  Some people become 
“ideologues,” while others have leanings that they can set aside to a degree 
when conducting scientific, legal, or other professional work, or simply 
living their lives. 
It seems to me that we miss a lot of what is important to know if we try 
to think about criminal justice, Supreme Court criminal procedure rulings, 
and ideas like the Blackstone principle without considering ideological 
frames.  One of the most valuable such frames for criminal justice analysis 
is Herbert Packer’s “two models” which identified the conflicting ideals and 
ideas of justices and scholars in the 1960s when the Court was erecting 
modern criminal procedure.  Packer’s approach encompasses a kind of a 
conservative-liberal continuum but in terms that capture the more specific 
concerns of constitutional lawyers.12  The “crime control” and “due process” 
models have had resonance as applied to criminal justice more broadly.13  
Packer also wisely and correctly included broad areas of agreement among 
“due process” or “crime control” adherents. 
 
 9  DANIEL KAHNEMAN, THINKING, FAST AND SLOW (2011).   
 10  JUDITH N. SHKLAR, LEGALISM: LAW, MORALS, AND POLITICAL TRIALS 1 (reprint ed., 
Harvard Univ. Press 1986). 
 11  KENNETH R. HOOVER, IDEOLOGY AND POLITICAL LIFE (2d ed. 1994). 
 12  Herbert L. Packer, Two Models of the Criminal Process, 113 U. PA. L. REV. 1 (1964); 
HERBERT L. PACKER, THE LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL SANCTION 149–246 (Stanford Univ. Press 
1968). In addition to sketching differences between “crime control model” and “due process 
model” adherents, it is worth recalling that Packer identified areas of agreement between the 
two models.   
 13  Hadar Aviram, Packer in Context: Formalism and Fairness in the Due Process Model, 
36 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 237 (2011). 
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From this perspective, I write as, among other things, a criminal justice 
social scientist / legal scholar who carries a (more or less) liberal or “due 
process model” perspective.  It may be impossible to be entirely aware of 
one’s cognitive biases or political leanings, but to deny that they exist seems 
foolish and may weaken readers’ abilities to fully comprehend an author’s 
message.14  Such awareness is only a starting point for legal or social scholars 
and for social scientists.  The legitimacy of their work is measured by their 
adherence to the canons of scholarship or the quality of their data collection 
and analytic strategies.  The anti-Blackstonians I critique write mainly in 
abstract terms, and Laudan and Allen even provide a mathematical proof.  
Professor Daniel Epps does allow that “one’s intuitions here will also depend 
on underlying views about the relationship between the state and its 
citizens,”15 and at points, Laudan and Allen express some displeasure with 
scholars who they view as insensitive to the suffering of serious crime 
victims, perhaps a muted criticism of liberals.  Awareness of one’s leanings 
can help explain why a scholar is drawn to certain subjects and why 
conclusions not dictated by scientific findings, as is often the case in 
jurisprudence, go in one direction or the other.16  Were it otherwise, five-to-
four rulings by the Supreme Court, accepted by constitutionalists as 
expressions of acceptable but contested views about conflicting ideals, 
would be viewed as beyond the pale of reason. 
One’s ideology is not easily changed as it “arises in the course of 
common social experiences” and thus, in a sense, binds one to a 
collectivity.17 Shklar subtly hints that her “ideological contribution,”—a 
“barebones liberalism”—is a “defense of social diversity” and pluralism, 
which is “common among members of permanent social minority groups.”18  
Although the works reviewed in The Anti-Blackstonians were written in 
abstract, theoretical, and formal terms,19 it makes sense to explore anti-
 
 14  My model is Shklar, see supra note 10, who linked her views on the legitimacy of the 
Nuremberg War Crimes Trial to the reasons for her attachment to a “barebones liberalism” of 
social diversity; this attachment, however, is not her argument, which unfolded in a complex 
and valuable political theoretic and jurisprudential analysis.   
 15  See Zalman, supra note 1, at 107, n.535 (quoting Daniel Epps, The Consequences of 
Error in Criminal Justice, 128 HARV. L. REV. 1065, 1138 (2015)).   
 16  Natural scientists, of course, also engage in disputes over the accuracy and 
interpretations of findings.   
 17  SHKLAR, supra note 10, at 5.  
 18  SHKLAR, supra note 10, at 5–6.  I have pondered this formulation for a long time and 
have taken it personally as a first-generation American citizen whose parents escaped the 
Holocaust and arrived in the United States after the Second World War had begun.  However, 
this personal take may only reflect how an individual evaluates his or her experiences in a 
historical context, thus suggesting that within-group ideological variation could have a genetic 
basis. See ROBERT A. BURTON, ON BEING CERTAIN: BELIEVING YOU ARE RIGHT EVEN WHEN 
YOU’RE NOT 102–23 (2008).   
 19  In fairness, this applies more to Epps and Laudan and Allen than to Cassell, although 
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Blackstonianism, to a degree, as a cluster of predilections which, because 
they affect law and criminal justice policy, fit into a more-or-less “crime 
control model” ideology.20 
Professor Cassell protests his inclusion as an anti-Blackstonian, and at 
various points, tries to position me as not a true “innocentric.”  As to the first 
point, I explained the basis for my grouping of Epps, Laudan and Allen, and 
Cassell in the article.  Epps defines himself as an anti-Blackstonian in 
preferring a theoretically neutral criminal procedure.  Laudan and Allen’s 
formal adherence to Blackstonianism rests mostly on the concern with a 
wrongful conviction also being a false negative (i.e., a “wrongful acquittal”) 
in wrong person cases, while Cassell seems to claim near perfection in that 
his trade-off proposals would almost always convict the guilty and acquit the 
innocent.  But I do not accept Laudan and Allen’s and Cassell’s versions of 
Blackstonianism as the genuine article.  I wrote: 
 
The overall direction of Cassell’s proposals would reduce 
defendants’ procedural protections.  I have no doubt that Laudan 
and Cassell genuinely grieve over false convictions.  However, 
although they claim adherence to a variation of the Blackstone 
ratio (in Laudan’s case) or the Blackstone principle (in Cassell’s 
case), I count them as anti-Blackstonians because despite their 
claims their programs would (1) seriously weaken defendants’ 
rights, (2) not reduce wrongful convictions, and (3) not enhance 
public safety.21 
 
What is of interest is Professor Cassell’s definition of innocentrism as a mode 
of thought that cares only about reducing wrongful convictions to the 
exclusion of other policies (except for trade-offs that increase crime) and his 
insistence that a scholar who claims to write from an innocentric position 
must adhere to it, to the exclusion of other ideas.22 
 
 
in Tradeoffs, supra note 5, at 1435, he takes up Laudan’s analytic approach with relish.  
 20  Supreme Court opinions can be written in the most abstract terms that never deviate 
from legal form, and yet, when examined by political scientists, are seen to align with the 
politics of the appointing President.  See LAWRENCE BAUM, IDEOLOGY IN THE SUPREME COURT 
(Princeton Univ. Press 2017).   
 21  Zalman, supra note 1, at 1327 n.15.   
 22  Although this is the gist of his critique of my positions, it goes against his third 
criterion for how an “innocentric” might proceed; by (1) asking if a proposal reduces wrongful 
convictions, (2) weighing any costs of increasing crime by releasing the guilty, and (3) asking 
if any competing values “such as constitutional requirements . . . clearly outweigh the 
presumption in favor of proposal (sic) that would otherwise protect the innocent.”  See 
Cassell, Tradeoffs, supra note 5, at 1346. A weakening of constitutional restraints on the 
government’s penal authority is such a competing value. 
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The need to explain to myself my adherence to this vision of the 
Blackstone principle led me at the conclusion of The Anti-Blackstonians to 
admit that if push comes to shove I will accept the possibility of some guilty 
going free to maintain a criminal procedure that strengthens civil liberty by 
limiting the exercise of undue state power.  This civil rights orientation is an 
expression of my liberalism.  However, the bulk of my analysis argues that 
the anti-Blackstonians are wrong in most respects in their assessments of 
trade-offs.  Epps’s empirical justifications are far too thin to support his 
argument.23  Laudan’s analysis is almost entirely ignorant of incapacitation 
analysis and his proposals, in addition to trashing constitutional rights 
wholesale, would likely increase crime and misery if adopted.24  Cassell’s 
proposals, despite his assertions, would do little or nothing to reduce 
wrongful convictions, a position I advanced in my article in this 
Symposium.25 
Professor Dan Medwed coined the term “innocentrism,” which stands, 
to a degree, outside the defense attorney ethic of not caring about guilt or 
innocence, but valorizes policies that improve criminal justice diagnosticity.  
Innocentrism makes sense only (or mostly) in the context of the modern 
innocence movement, which has the dual goal of exonerating factually 
innocent clients and establishing policies that tend to reduce wrongful 
convictions.  The latter goal includes improving the accuracy of police work, 
forensic science analysis, and prosecution decisions. Reforms that 
accomplish these ends will not only tend to reduce wrongful convictions but 
will make the (accurate) conviction of serious criminals more likely.26  Thus, 
innocentrism may discomfort some liberal legal scholars or defense 
attorneys who would support only accuracy reforms that favor defendants.27  
Toward the end of Professor Medwed’s article, writing to defenders, he does 
not pose innocentrism as an exclusive ideology: “What criticisms from the 
left occasionally appear to lack is an appreciation for innocentrism as a 
 
 23  Zalman, supra note 1, at Part III.A. 
 24  Zalman, supra note 1, at Part III.B. 
 25  See Zalman, supra note 1, at Part III.C. I will add a few brief comments regarding my 
critique of Professor Cassell’s article and chapter in Part II below in response to his reply, but 
I have no desire to expand my Reply into a full-blown reiteration of my positions in The Anti-
Blackstonians or engage in a continuing debate in this venue. 
 26  Laudan and Cassell put possible trade-offs at the front of their analysis.  My short 
conclusion is that trade-offs are theoretically possible and surely do occur; that Laudan’s 
analysis of trade-offs is hypothetical and based on a significant misunderstanding of the 
criminal justice process; that Cassell’s are either wrong or short of the mark (see part (2)), and 
that in the real world of agency practice and resource allocation and legislative policy making, 
innocentric reform proposals will be subjected to close analysis and withering criticism and 
will usually be rejected or if passed held to the most minimal terms. 
 27  See, e.g., Robert P. Mosteller, Protecting the Innocent: Part of the Solution for 
Inadequate Funding for Defenders, Not a Panacea for Targeting Justice, 75 MO. L. REV. 931 
(2010). 
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corollary to—not a replacement for—traditional defense theories; 
innocentrism simply provides another powerful tool in the strategic 
woodshed.”28  Professor Medwed might not be a true innocentric in Professor 
Cassell’s view, although some thought can be given to whether innocentrism 
applies equally to “innocence lawyering”29 as to innocence reform. 
As I noted, Professor Cassell takes me to task at several points for not 
being a thoroughgoing innocentric along the lines he lays down.  This is odd 
as his third criterion for how “an innocentric might proceed in evaluating a 
reform proposal” is: “Do any competing values—such as constitutional 
requirements or other concerns—clearly outweigh the presumption in favor 
of proposal that would otherwise protect the innocent.”30  As I have already 
stated, my liberal values, born of a sense of being, in Shklar’s terms, the 
member of a permanent social minority group, leads me to favor limits on 
the state’s penal apparatus that could threaten (my) civil liberties. But given 
the complexity of academic writing that can obscure or complicate the 
ideological roots of an author’s thinking, it is helpful to qualify many 
statements in the spirit of “more or less.”  I might be more willing than a 
Medwed or a Mosteller, among the defense-leaning innocentric scholars, to 
favor policies that make the prosecutor more proficient; likewise, Cassell 
may advocate positions that hide-bound prosecutors would oppose as too 
“liberal.”31  Nevertheless, in my estimation, most of Professor Cassell’s 
proposals made in the article and chapter that I reviewed, will not reduce 
wrongful convictions; I reject them on empirical or epistemic grounds, and 
if they hold the seeds of weakening constitutional protections, I reject them 
under his criterion number three (i.e., non-epistemic grounds). 
Having come out of the ideological closet as a liberal (of sorts),32 I 
briefly explain my innocentrism.  Professor Cassell labels me an innocentric 
and defines it rigidly, but does not quite get the gist of my self-definition.  
What I wrote was: “As a self-defined innocence scholar, I analyze the works 
 
 28  Daniel S. Medwed, Innocentrism, 2008 U. ILL. L. REV. 1549, 1566 (2008).  Professor 
Cassell may have been writing too fast to notice this when he wrote “Medwed never addressed 
what to do if the values associated with innocentrism conflicted with other values.”  Cassell, 
Tradeoffs, supra note 5, at 1466.   
 29  See D. Michael Risinger & Lesley C. Risinger, The Emerging Role of Innocence 
Lawyer and the Need for Role-Differentiated Standards of Professional Conduct, in 
CONTROVERSIES IN INNOCENCE CASES IN AMERICA 123–38 (Sarah Lucy Cooper ed., 2014). 
 30  Cassell, Tradeoffs, supra note 5, at 1466. 
 31  In his reply, Cassell notes that he has opposed mandatory minimum sentences and 
favored strengthening a defendant’s double jeopardy protections and other liberal positions.  
See Cassell, Tradeoffs, supra note 5, at 1467. 
 32  E.g., I believe that punishment theory needs to include a retributive base, although I 
favor the mildest punishments that are feasible to achieve several criminal justice and societal 
goals. From this heterodox, or perhaps idiosyncratic posture, I infer that every person (and 
writer) exhibits ideological variations of ideas that limit the precision of general labels.  
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of Epps, Laudan and Allen, and Cassell from an “innocentric” perspective.”33 
I am first a criminal justice scholar, with a grounding in law and social 
science, who has since 2005 studied the innocence movement and written 
about wrongful conviction in both legal and scientific journals.34  I placed 
my identification with innocentrism in scare quotes, which implies an 
agreement with Professors Medwed’s and Findley’s analyses that 
differentiates innocence policy from the kinds of policy stances associated 
with the criminal defense bar. Innocentrism is not some kind of sect that 
requires my suspension of disbelief in evaluating ideas, whatever their 
source. The relatively new social science of criminal justice engages in peer-
reviewed research that explores the way in which many elements of criminal 
justice operate; where deficiencies (functional and normative) occur, reforms 
are advocated.35  From this role orientation and my ideological position, I 
value several (possibly competing) goals: fewer wrongful convictions; 
greater ability to accurately identify and prosecute serious crimes; impose 
the least harmful punishments needed to achieve  a safe society; effective 
government and social welfare policies that either are designed to reduce 
crime or will have crime-reducing effects; non-violation of constitutional or 
human rights by law enforcement.  There are trade-offs and hidden costs to 
all such goals.  Resources are always scarce and the competitive policy 
process does not always generate the most rational policies.  Cost-benefit 
analysis is one potentially beneficial tool of policy analysis among others, 
although the technique has its own limits and hidden costs.36  Thus, while 
trade-offs between some of these goals surely exist, and while analysis is 
needed even if not perfect, my general view is that innocence (or innocentric) 
reforms proposed to date, do not have a crime enhancing effect. 
With these generalities in place, my analysis of the anti-Blackstonians 
from my “innocentric perspective” simply indicates a leaning that favors 
criminal justice policies that strengthen the ability of police, forensic science 
 
 33  Zalman, supra note 1, at Part III.B. 
 34  I do not practice law; I have been formally retired from the New York Bar for many 
years, and earned a Ph.D. in Criminal Justice from the State University of New York in 1977.   
 35  The discipline of criminal justice as a social science arguably emerged from federal 
funding that began in the 1970s and includes the policy-oriented work of criminologists. In 
recent years, the quality of crime and policy research has risen considerably, as can be seen 
by publications in such journals as Justice Quarterly, Criminology, Criminal Justice Policy 
Review and Criminology & Public Policy.   
 36  Darryl K. Brown, Cost-Benefit Analysis in Criminal Law, 92 CAL. L. REV. 323 (2004).  
See also 4 CRIMINOLOGY & PUB. POL’Y (Nov. 2005), https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/toc/
17459133/4/4 (consisting of an editorial introduction, a research article, and five 
commentaries, and exploring the “role of the cost-of-crime literature”).  That issue raises 
several concerns and criticisms of the methodologies employed and the omission of 
considerations of equity and fairness in some cost-of-crime estimates that undergird cost-
benefit analyses of criminal justice policies.  
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and prosecution to detect and convict guilty parties even if some in the 
defense attorney camp would not.  And if the conclusion to my article—
placing the value of limiting excessive governmental power in criminal 
justice above crime control if necessary (although measuring both categories 
is not easy)—is not truly innocentric in Professor Cassell’s eyes, so be it.  
But I thank him for helping me to clarify my position.  Whatever my position 
(“innocentrism plus”?), it does not mean that I have to believe in Professor 
Cassell’s assertions.37 
This leaves the question of whether Professor Cassell’s approach can 
legitimately be seen to fit into Packer’s “crime control” model, labeled 
“conservative” for convenience, with all the qualifications that a simple label 
cannot fully encompass the work of a mature scholar.  He seems to have none 
of it.  He writes that I try “to undercut [his] proposals by leveling the ad 
hominem attack that they ‘derive from a conservative, crime control model 
vision’ of criminal justice.”  He has a point when he wrote (in our earlier 
exchange) that I do not support this assertion.  I thus amend my (earlier) 
reply.  I base my assertion on the famous work of Professor Cassell and 
attorney, now Justice, Stephen Markman,38 which vigorously attacked the 
work of Hugo Bedau and Michael Radelet, who claimed that a number of 
twentieth century death sentences were handed down against innocent 
defendants.39  In their reply to the Bedau-Radelet study, Markman and 
Cassell asserted their belief that “the risk [of sentencing innocent defendants 
to death] is insignificant, in the sense that it is statistically minuscule and 
also in the sense that it does not affect the validity of our society’s considered 
judgment that the benefits of capital punishment outweigh the costs.”40  As 
for his recent article and chapter on wrongful conviction, which was the 
focus of my criticism, he takes positions to eliminate the Fourth Amendment 
exclusionary rule and abolish the Miranda rule.  These are famously 
identified as conservative/crime control policies.  As I noted in The Anti-
Blackstonians, they were key components of the Truth in Criminal Justice 
series of articles that emanated under Justice Markman’s direction in the 
Attorney Generalship of Edwin Meese in the Presidency of Ronald Reagan.41  
 
 37  Professor Cassell seems genuinely surprised that I do not join his purportedly 
innocentric ideas and chalks my opposition up to my adoption of “competing values.” See 
Cassell, supra note 5, at 1466.   
 38  See Stephen J. Markman & Paul G. Cassell, Protecting the Innocent: A Response to 
the Bedau-Radelet Study, 41 STAN. L. REV. 121(1988).  I began my analysis of Professor 
Cassell’s article and chapter on innocence issues with a sketch of this early work by Markman 
and Cassel. At present, Markman is a justice of the Michigan Supreme Court.   
 39  Hugo Adam Bedau & Michael L. Radelet, Miscarriages of Justice in Potentially 
Capital Cases, 40 STAN. L. REV. 21 (1987). 
 40  Stephen J. Markman & Paul G. Cassell, Protecting the Innocent: A Response to the 
Bedau-Radelet Study, 41 STAN. L. REV. 121, 122, n.3 (1988).   
 41  Zalman, supra note 1, at Part III.C.  In a lengthy footnote, Professor Cassell points to 
ZALMANREPLY (DO NOT DELETE) 8/10/2018  10:38 AM 
1502 SETON HALL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 48:1493 
If Professor Cassell’s position does not reflect a conservative/crime control 
ideology of criminal procedure, then I do not know what does. 
Yet, in our exchange, Professor Cassell provides evidence of his work 
as a scholar and decisions as jurist that supports defendants’ rights.42  Such 
variation supports an important and often overlooked feature of Packer’s 
two-model analysis, namely that there are significant areas of agreement 
among proponents of the two models.  Further, within the area of 
constitutional criminal procedure there are a number of cases in which jurists 
who undoubtedly have general ideological predilections have written 
opinions, whether for doctrinal or prudential reasons, appear to not be 
aligned with the judge’s “typical” orientation.43  Such variations reflect the 
reality that legal reasoning in general involves complex intellectual exercises 
requiring the application of elastic modes of jurisprudential thinking to 
variable fact situations. In these undertakings, while ideological 
predilections generally align with direction of authors’ writings, scholars and 
judges (at least in non-autocratic polities) retain such intellectual 
independence and integrity so that their decisions and writings do not adhere 
to a “party-line.”  My own evaluation of Professor Cassell’s articles on issues 
related to broad issues of innocence is that they reflect a degree of 
“innocence skepticism” that goes beyond valuable corrections to the risk of 
justice system errors that release factually guilty defendants or errors in 
innocence work,44 and make erroneous conclusions that are driven by a 
 
several academic and judicial positions he has taken that present as “liberal.”  As indicated, I 
do not assert that ideological predilections are necessary monolithic, and for most scientists 
and academics, predilections tend to be muted or complicated, but it seems foolish to me to 
deny their existence.  
 42  See Cassell, Tradeoffs, supra note 5, at 1467 n.141. 
 43  E.g., Chief Justice Warren’s majority opinion in Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968); 
Justice Brennan’s majority opinion in Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757 (1966); Justice 
Scalia’s majority opinion in Arizona v. Hicks, 480 U.S. 321 (1987); and Justice O’Connor’s 
dissenting opinion in Illinois v. Krull, 480 U.S. 340 (1987).   
 44   The innocence movement does not deny that errors can be made by those who work 
to exonerate the wrongfully convicted.  In the well-attested case of Roger Coleman, post-
execution DNA analysis connected him to the rape-murder for which he was executed. To the 
great credit of James McCloskey, director of Centurion Ministries who worked to clear 
Coleman, as soon at the truth was known, McCloskey issued a candid press release 
acknowledging his error and the vital importance of seeking the truth.  See Press Release, 
James C. McCloskey, Exec. Dir., Centurion Ministries, Inc., On the Roger Coleman DNA 
Testing Results (Jan. 12, 2006), http://centurion.org/_faq/coleman-roger-press-release.pdf.  
Another troubling case in which an exoneration is questionable is that of Anthony Porter, 
which Cassell identified in his article.  See Cassell, Tradeoffs, supra note 5, at 10 n.57.  These 
examples indicate that all criminal case analyses are subject to error.  Innocence organizations, 
however, routinely screen out requests for assistance from prisoners who do not appear to be 
innocent.  See Gwendolyn Carroll, Proven Guilty: An Examination of the Penalty-Free World 
of Post-Conviction Testing, 97 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 665 (2007).  The National Registry 
of Exonerations welcomes any information regarding the exonerations it posts and stands 
willing to reconsider its conclusions.  
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more-or-less conservative, crime control orientation. 
III. A BRIEF AND PARTIAL REPLY TO SOME OF PROFESSOR CASSELL’S 
POINTS 
Professor Cassell’s reply article necessarily reprises some of his 
arguments in his prior article and chapter.45  I don’t intent to engage in a full 
scale development of any counter-arguments or repeat the critique in my 
main article. His rather lengthy reply seems to dare me to come out of hiding 
and enter an extended (and perhaps continuing) debate on his counter- points.  
For the most part, I rest my arguments on what I wrote in The Anti-
Blackstonians, but I will add or emphasize a few points 
A. Trade-offs Are Inevitable 
No one can rationally disagree that efforts to decrease wrongful 
conviction might in some cases allow the guilty to escape, or, conversely, 
that the large-scale enterprise to enforce the law and convict the guilty 
routinely generates wrongful convictions.  Innocence lawyers (and 
prosecutor’s offices’ conviction integrity units) focus on the latter problem, 
while prosecutors are rightly concerned (acting within the bounds of law) to 
prevent the former in legal practice.  When it comes to policy advocacy the 
innocence movement and aligned independent scholars (me included) focus 
on the latter issue.  It is in the abstract a good thing that some scholars take 
what seems to be a minority position in the field of innocence scholarship 
and pose the question of whether innocence reforms might on balance do 
more harm than good.  In the execution, however, I have a number of 
concerns with Professor Cassell’s ideas, which led to my criticism in The 
Anti-Blackstonians. 
Various proposed and enacted innocence reforms, which are only 
beginning to come on line, should be examined for possible unexpected 
consequences.  But some of Professor Cassell’s proposals for modifying the 
procedural landscape of criminal justice have been implemented and tested.  
Building on extant scholarship he claims that eliminating procedural 
challenges under the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule and Miranda will 
free up defense attorney time to focus on factual issues, without allowing for 
additional resources (money46) to reduce excessive caseloads and increase 
investigative services for defendants.  I am skeptical that the expected time 
saving will result in more robust lawyering, and Professor Cassell’s 
assertions do not make it so.  However, in contrast to this hypothetical 
 
 45  Cassell, Freeing the Guilty, supra note 4; Cassell, Can We Protect the Innocent, supra 
note 4.  
 46  Cassell, Tradeoffs, supra note 5, at 1485. 
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improvement, historical analysis can support the thesis that the Supreme 
Court’s watering down of constitutional protections since 1972 has enabled 
police and prosecutors to engage in “wars” on drugs crime that resulted in 
mass incarceration.  Procedural rights minimization has not alone led to the 
socially dysfunctional expansion of the American correctional apparatus 
(i.e., mass incarceration), but it has been a contributing factor.47 
Is this issue orthogonal to wrongful convictions? A hard-to-test 
hypothesis but one worthy of consideration is that the war on crime/drugs 
overwhelmed the criminal justice system with less serious cases that caused 
more false convictions and fewer accurate convictions than would otherwise 
have resulted.  The mechanisms included the judicial attenuation of 
exclusionary rules that sapped defense lawyers’ abilities to fight against 
expanded drug arrests and draconian penalties for drug crimes.  Thus, not 
only has mass incarceration harmed America’s economy and deepened racial 
animosities, but has diverted the attention and resources of law enforcement, 
forensic science (burdened with testing drugs), and prosecutors from 
addressing serious violent and property crimes.48 
B. Abolishing the Fourth Amendment Exclusionary Rule 
Professor Cassell’s reply does not acknowledge that the exclusionary 
rule today, after two generations of evisceration by the Supreme Court, is a 
hollow shell of what was envisaged by Warren Court justices. Worse, from 
an innocentric perspective, he avoids the data I adduced showing that search 
and seizure practice, unrestrained by effective legal challenges, today allows 
the police to plant illegal evidence on innocent people, creating many 
wrongful convictions.49  I may have been too fast in dismissing out of hand 
some jurists’ suggestion of yesteryear that the exclusionary rule be replaced 
by administrative control measures,50 dismissing them simply as rights-
stripping stalking horses.  I assume that such proposals were made in good 
faith. Indeed, based in part on research, I support administrative measures as 
being more effective in shaping the law-following behavior of police than 
 
 47  See ERNEST DRUCKER, A PLAGUE OF PRISONS: THE EPIDEMIOLOGY OF MASS 
INCARCERATION IN AMERICA (New Press 2011).  A packed bookcase of works on the ills of 
mass incarceration exists.  
 48  Hannah Laqueur et al., Wrongful Convictions, Policing, and the ‘Wars on Crime and 
Drugs,’ in EXAMINING WRONGFUL CONVICTIONS: STEPPING BACK, MOVING FORWARD 93–107 
(Allison D. Redlich et al. eds., 2014). 
 49  More than 1800 “group exonerations” have been identified by the National Registry 
of Exonerations.  See Samuel Gross et al., Race and Wrongful Convictions in the United 
States, NAT’L REGISTRY OF EXONERATIONS, at 20–26 (Mar. 7, 2017), 
https://www.law.umich.edu/special/exoneration/documents/race_and_wrongful_convictions
.pdf.   
 50  E.g., Chief Justice Burger’s proposal in Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 500–01 
(Burger, C.J., concurring).   
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the exclusionary rule.  The exclusionary rule, however, remains useful as a 
legal backstop to enforce constitutional rights and a robust Fourth 
Amendment provides police officials with a reason to enact meaningful 
administrative rules.  Where stakes are high, redundancy has value.  
Professor Cassell seems mired in past examples.  I would suggest that he 
look into research supporting the benefits of devices like community review 
boards, early intervention models and federal consent decrees in his desire 
to ensure that police do not violate constitutional rights and are not under 
such lax procedures that that they feel free to corruptly plant incriminating 
evidence on innocent people.51  Such devices to ensure police law-
abidingness should reduce the opportunities police have to use their search 
and seizure powers to create wrongful convictions. 
I will add, without extended constitutional exegesis, that I believe that 
retaining the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule and the Miranda 
exclusionary rule tends to restrain excessive police power and uphold the 
rule of law.  My  “search and seizure philosophy,” derived in large measure 
from Professor Heffernan’s analysis, is that the Fourth Amendment is 
incoherent without the exclusionary rule,52 and that the four dissenters in 
Herring had the better argument.53  At some future point, I am confident that 
the Supreme Court, removed from the political fires that unduly politicized 
criminal procedure protections,54 will restore the rule and repair the damage 
to the Fourth Amendment.  That said, this is not the place to reprise the huge 
doctrinal debate over Miranda and the exclusionary rule as Professor Cassell 
seems to be eager to do.  My position is based on my legal perspectives on 
the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule and Miranda, which, I believe fall 
within a range of accepted legal discourse.55  This position is not strongly 
supported by social science, as I seek to separate my policy desiderata from 
what can be supported by empirical research.  The exclusionary rule may 
 
 51  SAMUEL WALKER, THE NEW WORLD OF POLICE ACCOUNTABILITY (2005).  Professor 
Cassell has forwarded a copy of a lengthy analysis that addresses police behavior; I pass on 
the reference shortly before our manuscript submission date, unread: Paul G. Cassell & 
Richard Fowles, What Caused the 2016 Chicago Homicide Spike? An Empirical Examination 
of the “ACLU Effect” and the Role of Stop and Frisks in Preventing Gun Violence (undated) 
(unpublished manuscript) (on file with Paul G. Cassell).  
 52  William C. Heffernan, The Fourth Amendment Exclusionary Rule as a Constitutional 
Remedy, 88 GEO. L.J. 799 (2000); see also Thomas Y. Davies, Recovering the Original 
Fourth Amendment, 98 MICH. L. REV. 547 (1999). 
 53  Herring v. United States, 555 U.S. 135 (2009). 
 54  LOUIS M. KOHLMEIER JR., GOD SAVE THIS HONORABLE COURT! (1972). 
 55  In this area of law, I am not sure if it is entirely possible to write from a purely 
disinterested or “umpireal” perspective, so when writing about constitutional criminal 
procedure, I also write as a citizen who remembers the McCarthy era with its attendant 
blacklists, and who desires the protections that the law offers to him and his family from 
undue government intrusion.  See SAMUEL WALKER, THE RIGHTS REVOLUTION: RIGHTS AND 
COMMUNITY IN MODERN AMERICA (Oxford Univ. Press 1998). 
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have no measurable empirical restraining effect on actual police behavior but 
it is quite plausible that its ethical principles inspired police leaders to make 
constitutional policing a hallmark of their leadership, as it has with William 
Bratton.56  While it is empirically impossible to directly prove the effect of 
the exclusionary rule (in that it requires proving a negative), empirical 
research supports the idea that where police chiefs encourage constitutional 
policing, the rank and file are more likely to comply with the Constitution.57  
On this basis (less than robust proof), my values lead me to argue that the 
constitutional protections Professor Cassell would eliminate are worth 
saving.58 
C. The “Freeing Up Time” Argument 
Professor Cassell argues at some length that stripping rights will free 
up time for defense attorneys to pursue actual innocence.  This idea has been 
advanced by estimable scholars.  But, it is only a hypothesis.  There is no 
empirical evidence I know of to support this theory.  The hypothesis seems 
facially implausible when considering the widely acknowledged scarce 
investigation resources available to indigent defenders and a sense of how 
much time practicing trial attorneys devote to brief writing (and 
acknowledging the widespread existence of “canned briefs”) compared to 
plea bargaining.  To borrow from my critique of Professor Epps, a theoretical 
proposal that seem specious on its face is too thin a reed on which to propose 
stripping rights from defendants. 
D. Moral Hazard 
But Professor Cassell’s proposals may have a darker side.  Early in his 
reply, he proposes that giving police greater power to search will provide 
them with “the functional equivalent of a crystal ball” to ascertain the ground 
truth in cases.59  He would make it constitutional by placing convicted 
defendants on extended ten-year parole.  In Cassell’s world, police appear to 
be incorruptible and he seems oblivious to the moral hazard that expanded 
search power is an opportunity to expand police corruption.60  I might add 
that Professor Cassell’s proposal would require a massive increase to the 
correctional bureaucracies of states at a time the growing conservative push 
 
 56  WILLIAM BRATTON & PETER KNOBLER, TURNAROUND: HOW AMERICA’S TOP COP 
REVERSED THE CRIME EPIDEMIC (1998).   
 57  Bradley C. Canon, Testing the Effectiveness of Civil Liberties Policies at the State and 
Federal Levels: The Case of the Exclusionary Rule, 5 AM. POL. Q. 57 (1977), http://journals.sa
gepub.com/doi/pdf/10.1177/1532673x7700500103. 
 58  I hold to this position especially in light of the empirically implausible idea that 
eliminating rights would free defense attorney time to search for evidence of clients’ guilt.   
 59  Cassell, Tradeoffs, supra note 5, at 1439. 
 60  See Zalman, supra note 1, at Part III.B.3. 
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against greater penal control is in part a concern about expanding 
governmental bureaucracies.61 
E. Replacing Miranda Rules with Videotaping of Custodial 
Interrogations 
Professor Cassell has assiduously attacked the Miranda decision 
throughout his career.62  He does valiantly support the video recording of 
interrogations as a means of improving the accuracy of interrogation-
generated admissions.  Although this is a step in the right directions, it is 
becoming clear that video recording is not a panacea and that those truly 
concerned with methods of police questioning that is both less abusive, less 
likely to generate false confession and obtain more information from 
suspects needs to learn more about the investigative interview, a technique 
developed in England that police training companies are beginning to adopt.  
I made this point in The Anti-Blackstonians.63 
F. Post-Conviction Review 
Professor Cassell endorses Joseph Hoffman and Nancy King’s proposal 
to abolish state prisoner habeas review “except for those who couple a 
constitutional claim with ‘clear and convincing proof of actual 
innocence.’”64  Federal habeas requires exhaustion of state remedies and, 
when it results in exoneration, comes many years after the initial, costly, 
injustice.  As Sam Gross and Robert Mosteller have explained, wrongful 
convictions are very hard to detect and scrimping on opportunities to allow 
review will consign more innocents to die in prison.  That said, the costs of 
federal habeas review have been exhaustively analyzed by the scholars cited 
by Professor Cassell and others.65  I would prefer to maintain and even 
expand habeas, subject to expert and dispassionate cost-benefit analysis, but 
 
 61  Bruce Rauner, the Republican governor of Illinois, has been praised for his effective 
prison reduction program.  Edith Brady-Lunny & Ted Gest, Justice Success Story: How 
Illinois Cut Its Prison Population, The Crime Report, CTR. ON MEDIA CRIME & JUST. (Jan. 29, 
2018), https://thecrimereport.org/2018/01/29/justice-success-story-how-illinois-cut-its-priso
n-population/. 
 62  Paul G. Cassell & Richard Fowles, Still Handcuffing the Cops? A Review of Fifty Years 
of Empirical Evidence of Miranda’s Harmful Effects on Law Enforcement, 97 B.U. L. REV. 
685 (2017).   
 63  See sources in Zalman, supra note 1, at Part III.C.2.c.  See also JAMES L. TRAINUM, 
HOW THE POLICE GENERATE FALSE CONFESSIONS: AN INSIDE LOOK AT THE INTERROGATION 
ROOM (2016); Marvin Zalman, Laura Rubino & Brad Smith, Beyond Police Compliance with 
Electronic Recording of Interrogation Legislation: Toward Error Reduction, CRIM. JUST. 
POL’Y REV. 1 (2017), http://journals.sagepub.com/doi/pdf/10.1177/0887403417718241.   
 64  Cassell, Tradeoffs, supra note 5, at 56; Joseph L. Hoffmann & Nancy J. King, 
Rethinking the Federal Role in State Criminal Justice, 84 N.Y.U. L. REV. 791, 820 (2009). 
 65  John H. Blume et al., In Defense of Noncapital Habeas: A Response to Hoffman and 
King, 96 CORNELL L. REV. 4365 (2011). 
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as a backstop to more robust state post-conviction review.  An avenue that I 
did not address but is worthy of serious analysis is improved state level 
appellate and post-conviction review of convictions both for procedural error 
and factual error.66  The most innovative change along these lines is the 
North Carolina Innocence Inquiry Commission (NCIIC).  Recent analyses 
of this institution indicate that it has come under prosecutorial criticism, 
could improve its procedures, but is deemed successful.67  States may be able 
to enact some benefits of the NCIIC model without establishing an agency.  
This important subject calls out for more legal and empirical analysis. 
G. Requiring Defense Attorneys to Directly Ask Their Clients About 
Guilt 
My original comments on this proposal were short and I will not add 
much, although in his reply, Professor Cassell raises a good deal of 
argumentation.  Upon reading his reply, it struck me that Professor Cassell’s 
proposal is underdeveloped and could be fleshed out by giving more 
consideration to the acute chapter on innocence lawyering by the Risingers68 
and to Keith Findley’s article-length thought experiment about tinkering 
with the roles of prosecutors and defense lawyers,69 both of which are cited 
by Professor Cassell but not considered in depth.  I will admit that I am now 
not sure if Professor Cassell’s proposal would in fact make defense lawyers 
“subservient” to prosecutors.  In his reply, he would “require” defense 
lawyers to ask their clients about guilt or innocence.70  A rule to “require” 
compliance implies enforcement.  What I did not see in Professor Cassell’s 
reply is whether his proposal would pierce lawyer-client confidentiality and 
open the client’s response to the court and the prosecution.  If not, his words 
are all bluster.  If so, his proposal is a radical departure from the adversary 
system that would indeed make defense lawyers subservient to prosecutors.  
In his proposal, Professor Cassell bemoans that defense lawyers are 
indifferent to their clients’ innocence, and yet, this stance is a pillar of the 
adversary system.  It is fair game to critique the adversary system and 
 
 66  See Keith A. Findley, Innocence Protection in the Appellate Process, 93 MARQUETTE 
L. REV. 591 (2009). 
 67  Warren D. Hynson, North Carolina Innocence Inquiry Commission: An Institutional 
Remedy for Actual Innocence and Wrongful Convictions, 38 N.C. CENT. L. REV. 142 (2016); 
Robert P. Mosteller, N.C. Innocence Inquiry Commission’s First Decade: Impressive 
Successes and Lessons Learned, 94 N.C. L. REV. 1725 (2016). 
 68  Risinger & Risinger, supra note 29, at 135. 
 69  Keith A. Findley, Adversarial Inquisitions: Rethinking the Search for the Truth, 56 
N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 911 (2012). 
 70  “I proposed that we could reorient defense counsel by simply requiring them to ask 
their clients about the subject.” Cassell, Tradeoffs, supra note 5, at 1479. 
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propose alternatives,71 but to suggest that a critical element of the defense 
role be eliminated without considering its consequences is either an ignorant 
proposal, which is inconceivable in such an accomplished jurist as Professor 
Cassell, or a sly move to checkmate one’s opponent.  In my understanding, 
the greater good that supports that defense attorney’s “immoral” indifference 
to factual guilt or innocence,72 is that it is virtually the only mechanism in 
the adversary system that puts the prosecutor to her proof. The voluminous 
contemporary literature on prosecutorial dominance over charging73 makes, 
in my mind, Professor Cassell’s proposal dangerous if it were to be treated 
seriously. 
H. Increasing Defense Lawyer Resources 
Again, I will not add much.  Resources can be increased by more money 
or by greater efficiencies, or both.  I alluded in my article to studies that are 
beginning to get a handle on increasing the efficiency of public defenders, 
so that they can be more effective within the constraint of limited funds.  As 
Professor Cassell opined, a robust defense, which I assume includes 
adequate investigative resources, is perhaps the most important way to 
prevent wrongful convictions.  I hope that in future writings he explores the 
subject of efficiencies and providing investigative resources to the defense 
in greater depth.74 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 71  See Marvin Zalman & Ralph Grunewald, Reinventing the Trial: The Innocence 
Revolution and Proposals to Modify the American Criminal Trial, 3 TEX. A&M L. REV. 189 
(2015).  
 72  Setting aside that ascertaining the ground truth is not always easy, see Mosteller, supra 
note 67. 
 73  See Zalman, supra note 1, at 1348–49 nn.147–53.  
 74  Professor Cassel pointed out that in an op-ed article with former federal judge Nancy 
Gertner, they criticized Congress for cutting funding for the federal defenders’ service.  Paul 
Cassell & Nancy Gertner, Public Defenders Fall to the Sequester, WALL ST. J. (Aug. 20, 
2013), https://www.wsj.com/articles/public-defenders-fall-to-the-sequester-1377039667.  I 
was not aware of this and am heartened by this stance.   
ZALMANREPLY (DO NOT DELETE) 8/10/2018  10:38 AM 
1510 SETON HALL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 48:1493 
I. More Research and Dry Wells75 
As indicated in my article, I think that his effort to ascertain the “true” 
number of wrongful convictions will not add much to current knowledge.76  
As scholars are learning, the innocence movement is becoming an 
exoneration movement,77 and as Sam Gross has argued, exonerations are our 
best proxy for wrongful convictions, with all the gaps of knowledge that are 
inevitable.  The fundamental limit of the kind of study proposed by Professor 
Cassell is the ground-truth problem.  In my maiden article on wrongful 
conviction, I had the temerity to challenge Barry Scheck and Peter Neufeld’s 
proposal to treat exonerations as the National Transportation Safety Board 
treats airplane crashes on the grounds that reconstructing a case (which 
amounts to retrying it) is not the same as analyzing the pieces of a downed 
airliner, black box and all.78 
Another problematic aspect of Professor Cassell’s proposal is site 
selection.  As for dry wells, by definition, Professor Risinger’s study of 
murder-rape death penalty exonerations was not a dry well because his ratio 
was based on a known denominator drawn from a national universe of cases, 
a rare and instructive phenomenon.79  Substructuring of wrongful conviction 
can be thought to apply geographically or jurisdictionally.80  Thus, an 
arduous Cassellean study of the number of wrongful convictions in Utah 
finding (let us say) a minuscule number would, I assume, be due to the high 
levels of professionalism and probity in that estimable state, but would miss 
the possibility that the wrongful conviction rate is very high in neighboring 
Nevada, which might just be a sinkhole of criminal justice incompetence and 
corruption.  As the National Registry of Exonerations dryly reports, the 
number of exonerations “may not reflect the frequency of false conviction 
 
 75  Cassell, Tradeoffs, supra note 5, at 1489–90. 
 76  Zalman, supra note 1, at Part III.C.2.a. As noted, just as we were finishing our 
comments, Professor Cassell forwarded a manuscript.  Paul G. Cassell, Overstating America’s 
Wrongful Conviction Rate? Reassessing the Conventional Wisdom About the Incidence of 
Wrongful Convictions (undated) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with Paul G. Cassell).  I 
have not had time to read the manuscript but I offered comments to him for what I believe 
was an earlier draft of that manuscript.  As with many of the issues raised by Professor Cassell, 
each is worthy of lengthy discussion.  At this point, I will stand by what I wrote with a proviso 
that this issue might be visited at some point in the future.   
 77   See Richard Leo, Has the Innocence Movement Become an Exoneration Movement? 
The Risks and Rewards of Redefining Innocence, in WRONGFUL CONVICTIONS AND THE DNA 
REVOLUTION: TWENTY-FIVE YEARS OF FREEING THE INNOCENT 57–83 (Daniel Medwed ed., 
2017).  
 78  Marvin Zalman, Cautionary Notes on Commission Recommendations: A Public Policy 
Approach to Wrongful Convictions, 41 CRIM. L. BULL. 169 (2005).  
 79  D. Michael Risinger, Innocents Convicted, 97 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 761 (2007) 
 80  Perhaps substructuring can apply to different kinds of criminal convictions that have 
different wrongful conviction rates (which we cannot know and which might fluctuate). 
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across jurisdictions.”81 
IV. WEIGHING COSTS OF WRONGFUL CONVICTIONS 
In the first part of his reply, Professor Cassell joins in Dr. Laudan’s 
cost-benefit analysis based on the Laudan and Allen observation that false 
negatives far outnumber wrongful convictions.  “On this point I fully agree 
with him, and I doubt whether any of the other symposium participants 
dispute this point.” No, none of the Symposium participants disagree with 
the numbers, but Professor Cassell entirely misses the point made by 
criminologists Brian Forst and Sean Bushway,82 law professor Michael 
Risinger,83 and I,84 and we seem to be talking past each other on this point.  
The impunity experienced by those who get away with serious crimes is a 
mostly a result of upstream problems: crimes are hard to detect, many crimes 
are not reported, inept policing lets criminals get away, repressive policing 
discourages reporting, and the like.  Professor Cassell’s failure to understand 
(or express) the difference between apples and oranges and his willingness 
to join Dr. Laudan’s ignorance about incapacitation research makes his 
weighing of the costs of crime less than useful. 
A. The Parole Extension Proposal85 
To “improve” on Laudan’s proposal to lower the burden of proof in 
criminal trials, which is patently unconstitutional, Professor Cassell almost 
gleefully suggests that instead of lowering the burden of proof, any violent 
felony conviction carry a fixed “additional” ten-year parole term.  It is ironic 
that this parole-officer-full-employment proposal is advanced in a portion of 
the Symposium focused on trade-offs, without a nod to the need for cost-
benefit analysis to determine if such a proposal makes criminological, social, 
fiscal, and actuarial sense. Professor Cassell simply assumes (or has been 
convinced) that Laudan and Allen’s crime statistics analysis is valid. A critic 
might see a cognitive bias at work.86  I would offer a “liberal” amendment 
 
 81  NAT’L REGISTRY OF EXONERATIONS, EXONERATIONS IN 2016 5 (Mar. 7, 2017), 
https://www.law.umich.edu/special/exoneration/Documents/Exonerations_in_2016.pdf. 
 82  See BRIAN FORST, ERRORS OF JUSTICE: NATURE, SOURCES AND REMEDIES 57–65 
(2004); Shawn D. Bushway, Estimating Empirical Blackstone Ratios in Two Settings: Murder 
Cases and Hiring, 74 ALB. L. REV. 1087 (2011), reviewed in Zalman, supra note 1, at Part II 
C.1. 
 83  See D. Michael Risinger, Tragic Consequences of Deadly Dilemmas: A Response to 
Allen and Laudan, 40 SETON HALL L. REV. 991 (2010). 
 84  Zalman, supra note 1, at Part II.B.3. 
 85  Cassell, Tradeoffs, supra note 5, at 1488–91. 
 86  A panel of twenty experienced directors of community corrections programs have 
called for slashing the numbers on parole by half.  See COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY JUSTICE LAB, 
TOO BIG TO SUCCEED: THE IMPACT OF THE GROWTH OF COMMUNITY CORRECTIONS AND WHAT 
SHOULD BE DONE ABOUT IT (Jan. 29, 2018), http://justicelab.iserp.columbia.edu/img/Too_Bi
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and suggest that parole be accompanied with a panoply of social welfare 
support that would go a long way to reducing recidivism. One study found 
that civil rights awards of $500,000 plus was associated with lower offending 
by exonerees.87  The Sentencing Project  not long ago advocated an idea 
based on European practices, that no criminal penalty could exceed twenty 
years of imprisonment, but the law would allow longer imprisonment 
dependent on individualized review concluding that the prisoner has a 
continuing propensity for violence.88  To borrow from Jeff Foxworthy, if 
your immediate reaction is that this idea is preposterous, you might be a 
conservative.  But if you like this idea, you might be a liberal. 
V. WHY IS THIS SUBJECT IMPORTANT? 
Gary Graham, executed in 2000 for a robbery murder based exclusively 
on fleeting eyewitness testimony was a messed up youth who did terrible 
things to people at the time he was arrested. There is a good chance that 
Graham was factually innocent of the crime for which he was executed.89 
Was his moral worth as a human being relevant? 
Throughout his writing, Professor Cassell points out the prior 
criminality of some exonerees and would factor a “moral” element into 
calculations of whether to value the harms of crime victims more than those 
wrongfully convicted.90 By the same metric, should we consider that some 
crime victims do not merit full sympathy because of their prior criminality 
and other personal immoralities and thereby seek to create a weaker crime 
prevention system because some victims do not deserve our full sympathy?  
My position is that policies addressing wrongful conviction should, by 
analogy with the defense attorneys not caring about the client’s “actual” 
guilt, aim to create the most reliable system for the benefit of all in as neutral 
a way as possible. 
When I began teaching a wrongful conviction class in 2003, aside from 
any issue of justice, it seemed clear that wrongful convictions have great 
emotive power, which in the real world of policy making could be a force 
mobilized to effect changes to a system, guarded by powerful political 
figures who are reflexively resistant to outside reform pressures.  From this 
perspective, the prior criminality of exonerees should be irrelevant to policy 
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makers.  Of course, in the world of politics a “poster boy” exoneree like Kirk 
Bloodsworth influences people.91  However, as the goal of innocentrism is 
to create a more efficient, accurate, reliable and professional criminal justice 
system, not only to the benefit of the innocent but to the detriment of those 
who commit serious crimes, justice scholars need to focus on meaningful 
reforms.92  This takes us back to the trade-offs asserted by the anti-
Blackstonians. 
My article noted a disconnect between the legal or analytic scholarship 
of the anti-Blackstonians and social science research.  I was concerned that 
some legal scholars advance criminal justice reforms without paying 
sufficient attention to data generated by research criminologists.93  I will 
leave it to readers to determine whether the Laudan and Allen analysis of 
trade-offs, endorsed by Professor Cassell, and criticized in The Anti-
Blackstonians, makes sense. 
But my concern is that their focus on trial processes and constitutional 
decisions misses the larger picture of a very uneven, often deficient, and 
sometimes corrupt, criminal justice apparatus.94  Such faults may be 
overlooked by readers with cognitive biases that make criticism of “our” 
criminal justice system distasteful.  Thus, when Professor Cassell suggests 
that my qualitative estimate of the incidence of false convictions “ultimately 
[] rests on little more than his own subjective sense of what the right figure 
is in this area,”95 he skips over my earlier attempt to use methods of national 
security estimations and my scan of descriptive literature that points to 
serious deficiencies in American criminal justice and my similar analysis in 
Part IV of The Anti-Blackstonians.96  Based on descriptive literature (i.e., 
qualitative research, law review articles, and serious investigative 
journalism) and analytic criminological research, it is my view that the 
American criminal justice system is deficient in many ways and in need of 
substantial reform.  I worry that Professor Cassell’s well-intentioned (but in 
my view deeply flawed) scholarship, will be used as ammunition by those in 
the law enforcement, forensic science, prosecutorial, and judicial 
communities who reflexively oppose necessary changes.  As for concerns 
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about crime control expressed by Professors Cassell, Laudan, and Allen, I 
believe that the bulk of criminal justice research shows that the most 
effective methods of suppressing serious crime are either orthogonal to or 
(slightly) improved by innocence reform.  The relatively small possibility of 
innocence reforms having an overall crime suppression effect is perhaps 
worthy of study, but not in the ways conducted by Professor Laudan or the 
other authors reviewed in The Anti-Blackstonians.  Much of what has passed 
for crime deterrence in recent decades has probably done little to reduce 
crime and may have increased false convictions.  The greater value of 
innocence movement reforms is in helping to create a more effective, 
accurate and fairer criminal justice process. 
 
